St. Photios the Great: On the Filioque and the Confusion of Trinitarian Persons and the Divine Nature

61.

Behold the excessiveness of this impiety. If the Father is a cause of the Spirit just as He is a cause of the Son, then the generation and the procession occur at the same time, because the Son is not begotten in an interval of time and the Spirit likewise proceeds without any interval of time. But if one says, as this impious and idle chatter does, that the “Spirit also proceeds from the Son” as if from the same cause, it could lead one to conceive of the nature as mutable and changing.

62.

Do you see the manifold flexibility of this ungodly thing? If, in accordance with the theological principles of the incorporeal and supernatural nature, the Son is begotten from the Father at the same time as the Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son, then the former procession and the latter procession each belong to a completely different person of the eternal Trinity. But if this is so, then how are the distinctions of the causes, and the divine operations of the persons maintained? And why is division induced against the indivisible, simple and unitary Person of the Spirit? For the person comes before the distinctions in energies and operations, especially because it is supported by the evidence of the superior and supernatural Word. . . .

63.

In all that is said above if something is said of one thing in the Godhead, and if this cannot be observed to be a property of the nature of the Almighty Trinity, then it is said of only one of the three Persons. But the procession of the Spirit cannot be contemplated of the more-than-nature unity of the Trinity. Consequently, it is understood to be about only one of the Three. But the reasons for holding such a doctrine must be examined. If the Spirit proceeds from the Son no earlier or later than the Son is begotten from the Father (or the Son’s generation and the Spirit’s procession are removed as far as possible from the normal meanings associated with these temporal terms), and if they both proceed from the Father, the Son by generation and the Spirit by a procession within this very same generation, and if thus the Spirit is brought into existence simultaneously with the Son, then the Son is begotten, but the Spirit will be both begotten and proceeding. He will be begotten because He proceeds simultaneously in the Son’s generation. But He will be proceeding, because the dual procession is permanent. Who could have been so insane as to be carried away into such impiety?

–St. Photios the Great, The Mystagogy of the Holy Spirit 61-63 (Holy Cross Orthodox Press 1987; tr. Joseph P. Ferrell)

St. Photios the Great: On the Worship of the Trinitarian Persons and Not the Divine Nature

47.

. . . For it is not, I repeat, not the nature—that which is common amongst these persons—which is worshipped, but the specific person distinctions whereby the persons of the Trinity are distinguished.

–St. Photios the Great, The Mystagogy of the Holy Spirit 47 (Holy Cross Orthodox Press 1987; tr. Joseph P. Ferrell)

St. Photios the Great: On the Filioque and the Trinitarian Personal Characteristics

46.

Now it was right that you should understand all the implications of these godless men by means of such perceptions. The Catholic and Apostolic Church, instead of superstitious wanderings, is instructed in pure godliness to believe with the whole mind, and without doubtful thoughts, that each person of the Trinity is ineffably united in the common, undivided nature, and that they each maintain their specific and unique distinction, according to unchangeable doctrine. No occasion is given to overcome these distinctions by confusing the specific distinctions of each person. You are led astray, because no confusion of the distinctions with the common nature is accepted. In this way, each person of the three is designated by a separate characteristic, and is by no means mixed up into confusion. Just as the Son is begotten from the Father and remains immutable and unchanging in Himself, preserving the dignity of the Sonship, so too the All-Holy Spirit similarly proceeds from the Father and remains unchanged in Himself, preserving the immutable procession. And according to the Word Who is from the Father, the Spirit, being likewise produced (but according to a different type of production), is divine. Nor is He made into something new by any transmutation of His procession. This would mean that the Son is begotten from the uncaused Father, but not by generation! God forbid! But no divine procession is subject to participation in other privileges because of the common nature, because when this is introduced, it adulterates the Sonship.

–St. Photios the Great, The Mystagogy of the Holy Spirit 46 (Holy Cross Orthodox Press 1987; tr. Joseph P. Ferrell)

St. Photios the Great: On the Filioque and the Causal Division of the Holy Spirit

43.

Is it possible to avoid the conclusion that the Spirit has been divided into two? On the one hand, He proceeds from the Father, Who is the First cause and also unoriginate. On the other hand, however, He proceeds from a second cause, and this second cause is not underived. This heresy fabricates a distortion of the Spirit’s distinction, not merely by arrangement, but also in the category of His origin; it makes us cast off our adoration of the Trinity for a fourfold rashness. . . .

44.

And besides, if the Son is a cause of the Spirit on the one hand, and the Father is the cause of the Spirit on the other, then certainly a new cause is discovered in the perfect and consummate Trinity. Thus the lordly perfection of the first cause is destroyed, because, being imperfect and divided, it is therefore composite since it exhibits incompletion and consummate composition. . . .

–St. Photios the Great, The Mystagogy of the Holy Spirit 43-44 (Holy Cross Orthodox Press 1987; tr. Joseph P. Ferrell)

St. Photios the Great: On the Filioque and the Inferiority of the Holy Spirit

31.

. . . For if (O what if you have accosted the Spirit?) the procession from the Father is perfect—because Perfect God proceeds from Perfect God—then what specific and concrete thing does the procession from the Son contribute? For if it supplies something concrete and specific, then the procession from the Father would not be perfect and complete. . . .

32.

And again, if the Spirit proceeds from the Father, and the Son likewise is begotten of the Father, then it is in precisely this fact that the Father’s personal property is discerned. But if the Son is begotten and the Spirit proceeds from the Son (as this delirium of theirs would have it!) then the Spirit of the Father is distinguished by more personal properties than the Son of the Father: on the one hand as proceeding from the equality of the Son and the Spirit, the Spirit is thus derived from the person of the Father, if the Spirit is further differentiated by two distinctions brought about by the dual procession, then the Spirit is not only differentiated by more distinctions than the Son of the Father, but the Son is closer to the Father’s essence. And this is so precisely because the Spirit is distinguished by two specific properties. Therefore He is inferior to each of the other two persons and therefore inferior to the Son, Who in turn is of the same nature as the Father! Thus the Spirit’s equal dignity is blasphemed . . . .

37.

Furthermore, if the Son is begotten from the Father, and the Spirit (according to this innovation) proceeds from the Father and the Son, then by the same token another person should proceed from the Spirit, and so we should have not three but four persons! And if the fourth procession is possible then another procession possible from that, and so on to an infinite number of processions and persons, until at last this doctrine is transformed into a Greek polytheism!

–St. Photios the Great, The Mystagogy of the Holy Spirit 31-32, 37 (Holy Cross Orthodox Press 1987; tr. Joseph P. Ferrell)

St. Photios the Great: On the Filioque and Imperfection of the Trinitarian Persons

15.

. . . This impious doctrine [i.e., the filioque] also separates the person of the Father into two persons, since the ungodly doctrine frames laws for itself, mixing the person of the Son with that of the Father, as parts of the same thing. But the essence is not the cause of the Word; the Father is the personal cause of the person of the Word. But if, as this ungodly doctrine asserts, the Son is also a cause of the Spirit, then the personal feature of the Father is distributed to the Son. Ultimately you are forced to say this, or else to say that the Son completes the person of the Father. But to say that is to argue that the person of the Father is imperfect, wanting completion, and that the Son takes over the Father’s role and title. This is the same thing as reducing the awesome mystery of the Trinity to a mere dyad.

–St. Photios the Great, The Mystagogy of the Holy Spirit 15 (Holy Cross Orthodox Press 1987; tr. Joseph P. Ferrell)

St. Photios the Great: On the Filioque and Double Causation

3.

For if the Son and the Spirit came forth from the same cause, that is to say, the Father, and if—as this blasphemy cries out—the Spirit also proceeds form the Son, then why not simply tear up the Word and propagate the fable that the Spirit also produces the Son, thereby according the same dignity to each person by allowing each person to produce the other person? For if each person is in the other, then of necessity each is the cause and completion of the other. And not according to any different manner—by no means!–even if you say that the Spirit proceeds and the Son is begotten! For reason demands equality for each person so that each person exchanges the grace of causality indistinguishably.

4.

Some others recognize that the Son’s generation does not impair the indescribable simplicity of the Father. But since it is claimed that He proceeds from two persons, the Spirit is brought to a double cause, thereby obscuring the simplicity of the Most High. Does it not follow as an implication of this that the Spirit is therefore composite? How then is the Trinity simple? But on the other hand, how shall the Spirit not be blasphemed if, proceeding from the Son, He in turn has no equality by causing the Son? O impiously daring tongue, corrupting His own proper dignity!

6.

If so, then straightaway their profane, self-sufficient contentions against God are detected. For if each person is as great as the others, then the procession is common to all three person by virtue of the simple, indivisible essence. And if each person is as great as the others, then all share in a common and unique simplicity, and therefore the Spirit and the Father will be caused by the Son and the Spirit in a similar manner. Is this not the same thing as saying that “since the Son exists in the Father, He is as great as the Father, since neither of them is despoiled of the Spirit?” But according to the myriads of voices who piously delivered the doctrine of the indescribable Godhead on high, the Spirit is of the essence-above-essence [ousias hyperousion]. His eternal, incorporeal procession is therefore beyond the powers of reason. If these observations are not so, then no one is a Christian who is not carried away into diabolical disputations, choosing this new word [i.e., filioque] that the procession of the Spirit is from the Father “and the Son” as from a common source! And if this is so (no one could come to a bolder impiety!), then the Spirit would participate in His own procession: on the one hand as causing Himself, and on the other as being caused.

7.

But concerning the process of the Spirit “from the Son,” who formerly received it? For the procession of the Spirit from the Son is not contained in the procession from the Father. If we say this, then why does the assumption that the procession is not completed go unnoticed? Indeed, if either the composition or imperfection of the procession escapes notice, then it follows that neither the Father nor the Son derives the power of procession from each other (For some of the others flee from these conclusions, that is, the duality and composition which would contend against the simple, uncomposite essence).

8.

And you should also investigate the following argument: if the Son is begotten from the Father and the Spirit proceeds from the Son, by what reason do you not accord the Spirit, Who subsists in the same identical essence, the dignity of another procession from Himself at the same time? Otherwise you degrade Him Who is worthy of equal honor.

9.

And you should consider this: If the Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son (O deceiving drunkenness of impiety!), why do not the Father and the Spirit beget the Son for the very same reasons (which will atone for this blasphemous chattering which turns the monarchy into many principles and causes!) and make common to all three persons what uniquely characterizes the Son as well, combining the other two persons into one, in the same manner? Our Sabellius thus sprouts up from all of you, but this time with an even greater portent, in a sort of monstrous “semi-sabellianism.”

–St. Photios the Great, The Mystagogy of the Holy Spirit 3-4, 6-9 (Holy Cross Orthodox Press 1987; tr. Joseph P. Ferrell)

St. Photios the Great: On the Apostolic Faith Contra the Filioque

5.

Which of our common and holy Fathers said that the Spirit proceeds from the Son? Did any ecumenical confession establish it? And which of the great priests or bishops, inspired of God, affirmed this understanding of the Holy Spirit? For these men brought the Master’s teaching to fruition, and loudly proclaimed the splendor of the Master’s teaching. These prophetic writings and books, predetermined from ancient times, are sources of light, and in accordance with righteousness, anticipate the composite divisions and apostasies of this new ungodliness. And the men who do not think in like manner the Catholic and Apostolic Church contemptuously refutes in the anathemas; for the second of the seven Holy and Ecumenical Synods declared that the Holy spirit proceeds from the Father. The third received it by tradition; the fourth confirmed it; the fifth supported the same doctrine; the sixth sealed it; the seventh contended for it and proclaimed it. Accordingly, in each of their luminous proclamations the godly doctrine, that the Spirit proceeds from the Father and not also the Son, is boldly asserted. Would you then, O impious flock, draw away after unlawful teaching and controvert and contradict this teaching of the Master?

 

–St. Photios the Great, The Mystagogy of the Holy Spirit 5 (Holy Cross Orthodox Press 1987; tr. Joseph P. Ferrell)

 

St. Gregory Palamas: On the Divine Simplicity

L. . . . B[arlaamite]. Why is God not composed when He has both an eternal essence and an eternal activity?

O[rthodox]. . . . the divine is one and simple in its essence; and that “one” is, in an appropriate way, a whole in relation to all the things which we properly think about it, and not divided in relation to each individual part of them. For it is, as a whole, goodness, and, as a whole, wisdom, and, as a whole, justice, and, as a whole, power in our thoughts. Not because it becomes such, not even when it is thought, but because it is such from eternity and because it manifests itself through His works to us who are born later. For we have come to understand that He has been moved to produce the universe by His goodness, and also that He accomplished it completely since He has the power, and that He composed it in wisdom, and holds it together and rules it with foresight. But that that “one” is according to His essence and what genuine name can get, in accordance with that essence, that which produces and arranges the universe in unspeakable wisdom and power and goodness—no one has understood that yet to this very day.

–St. Gregory Palamas, Dialogue between an Orthodox and a Barlaamite which Invalidates in Detail the Barlaamite Error, L (Global Publications/CEMERS, n.d.; tr. Rein Ferwerda).

St. Gregory Palamas: On Participation in God

XLIV. O[rthodox]. Hence, when we know His activity but not His essence, we do not commit an outrage to the supernatural character of His simplicity. And when we participate in His activity but not in His essence, do we make the undivided divisible? You heard him [St. Basil the Great] also say: “The activities of God are manifold, but His essence is simple.” [Letters 234] Just as he who is manifold according to His activities is not manifold and divided according to His essence, so in the same way, He will not be participable according to His essence although He is participated according to His activities. And since we participate in Him differently—we will therefore participate in Him according to His activities, according to which He is also manifold. But we shall not participate in Him according to His essence; for according to His essence He is the least manifold in whatever way you look at it. No, but we kn ow His goodness and power and wisdom. How much can we know of each of them? For how can a limited knowledge grasp that infinity, or rather the infinities of that wisdom, that power, that goodness? But he says: “God also reveals Himself to people on the mountain itself, on the one hand by coming down from His proper watchtower, (and) on the other hand, by leading us up from our humble state here on earth in order that the Incomprehensible (“uncontainable”) is contained by a created nature in at least a moderate and most safe way.” [Gregory Nazianzus Orationes 45,11]

XLV. How then is He participated in and contained wholly when He is contained in a moderate way? And how is He not divided, when He is contained in a moderate way and remains altogether Incomprehensible (“uncontainable”)? . . . The great Basil stated well that “the activities of God are manifold but His essence is simple.” [Letters 234] And again: “The holy Spirit is simple according to His essence but manifold according to His activities.” [On the Holy Spirit 9,22] For all those things belong to the activities of God. And according to them we participate in God in a moderate way and, according to them, we see and think of Him dimly, one person more, the other less, one by his intelligence, the other by a godlike power; each of us participates in them in agreement with his own purity and reflects on them and on the basis of them draws his conclusions about Him who is altogether imparticipable and unthinkable according to His essence. Nevertheless, one could well state that God as a whole is participate in and though of on the basis of those activities according to a pious insight; for the divine is divided in an undivided way and not as bodies. But His goodness and His wisdom are not a part of Him and the greatness or the foresight are not other parts. But He is wholly goodness and wholly wisdom and wholly foresight and wholly greatness. For because He is one, He is not cut up in agreement with each of those activities, but in relation to each of them He is properly whole; through each of them He is known as one and simple and undivided, as being everywhere present and active as a whole.

 

XLVI. In that way those who participate in the activity of God participate in God as a whole, but not because we also participate in His essence in itself which is imparticipable and simple and undivided, and (we do) that all at the same time, but everyone differently. . . .

XLVII. . . . the things which are only sensible do participate and they participate in God as a whole because He is undivided, but only according to their being. But they do not partake of the vivifying power of God in whatever way, lest, when their own proper being is taken away, heaven itself is done away with together with the foundation of everything under the sky; i.e., the four elements and the beings without soul and perception which come forth from them. And things which have the property to live only according to perception participate through that perception in God as a whole, God who is participated in in every respect in an undivided way, but not also on the level of reason or intellect lest the irrational beings become rational. But because they do not participate on the level of reason, it is not true, therefore, that they do not participate in God as a whole. And the beings which participate in God on the level of reason or intellect do not all participate on the level of spirit as well, lest the wicked continue to be divine and spiritual people although they still abide in their wickedness. In that way, too, divine and spiritual people, participating in the grace of God but not in His essence, also participate in God as a whole. As a whole, because God, being present and active in them as a whole through the proper grace in a unified and simple and undivided way, is also known by them as a whole. But they do not in the least participate in His essence because they do not continue to be gods by their nature.

–St. Gregory Palamas, Dialogue between an Orthodox and a Barlaamite which Invalidates in Detail the Barlaamite Error, XLIV-XLVI, XLVII (Global Publications/CEMERS, n.d.; tr. Rein Ferwerda).